Projecting Organic Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: A Critical
Requirement of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team
CSC 2003
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Executive Summary

Title: PROJECTING ORGANIC INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE: A CRITICAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

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Thesis: The increase in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and proper projection of organic ISR capabilities is a critical requirement to the success of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT)[1].

Discussion: In accordance with Army's Transformation initiatives, the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) was created as a uniquely organized force capable of early entry to counter a wide range of threats. It is highly dependent on ISR to achieve dominance and precision. Technological advances have resulted in an enhanced ability to collect, process, and analyze vast amounts of assembled combat information and data across the spectrum of conflict. These capabilities rest in the military intelligence (MI) and cavalry units as a unique aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems to conduct intelligence operations.

The fundamental role of the SBCT's MI Company is to conduct ISR analysis, integration, and human intelligence collection. This effort spans across the full range of military operations in order to provide an accurate threat picture and answer the SBCT Commander's intelligence requirements.

The fundamental role of the SBCT's Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron is to provide detailed situational awareness to the BCT Commander, facilitating freedom of maneuver and the concentration of combat power at the decisive time and place.

Conclusion: The MI Company is in a new organic[2] role in the SBCT with improved collection and analysis operations. The new RSTA Squadron is an additional asset that the commander relies upon to obtain situational awareness and understanding. Therefore, combining the traditional roles of MI and cavalry with improved collection procedures facilitates a leveraging of ISR that is critical to the SBCT's ability to dominate maneuver and provide precision engagement. Without it, the SBCT would fail.

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[1] The Interim Brigade Combat Team was renamed the Stryker Brigade Combat Team in August 2002. The brigade is built around the Stryker, a new infantry carrier vehicle named in honor of two medal of Honor recipients: Private First Class Stuart S. Stryker and Specialist Robert F. Stryker, who served in World War II and Vietnam respectively.

[2] Organic assets are assigned to and forming an essential part of a military organization. Organic assets are those listed in the unit's MTOE.

CHAPTER 1

UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATION

If you don't understand transformation, now's a good time and place to get on board. [3]

Through most of the Cold War period (1945 – 1991), the United States

military capabilities and the majority of equipment, organization, and force structure

were designed to fight one formidable enemy—the Soviet Union. With the end of

the Cold War and the emergence of new adversaries, the threat to the United States

has become more asymmetric. Thus, the United States Armed Forces all required a

shift to a force tailored to the 21st Century threat. Consequently, under the

leadership of Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, the United States Army is taking

steps to transform itself into a more strategically responsive force. *Joint Vision (JV)*

2020 builds upon and extends the conceptual [model] established by *JV 2010* to

guide the continuing transformation of America's Armed Forces, [4] and sets the

context for a new Army doctrine, and introduces the concept of "transformation".

> If our Armed Forces are to be faster, more lethal and more precise in 2020 than they
> are today, we must continue to invest in and develop new military capabilities. This
> vision [*JV 2020*] describes the ongoing transformation to those new capabilities.[5]

As the United States Army attempted to increase its agility and versatility, it

also recognized that at the core of every military activity was information processing

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[3] Association of the United States Army Convention, *Convention Proceedings*, 17 October 2000 (Washington, DC: Eisenhower Luncheon Speech, 2000 by General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff Army), URL: < http://www.army.mil/leaders/CSA/speeches/EisenhowerLunch.htm>, accessed 16 January 2003. Cited hereafter as Shinseki AUSA Speech.

[4] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020 (Washington D.C.: June 2000), 1. Cited hereafter as Joint Vision 2020.

[5] Ibid.

and intelligence. Consequently, there was the need to restructure select units and assets. Of significance was improving upon the vital concept of providing ISR to support the new operational methods against the new potential threats. As a result, the SBCT was formed and organized with an organic MI Company and a RSTA Squadron (SQDN).

The success of the SBCT depends on its ability to detect enemy activity, share that information quickly, and defeat the threat before coming into close contact. This is in keeping with one of the key concepts defined in *JV 2020*: precision engagement - the ability to locate, monitor, discern, and track objectives or targets in order to engage them with appropriate systems, achieving the desired effects. This is the critical capability of the SBCT. Success at precision engagement depends on in-depth [collection and] analysis to identify and locate critical nodes and targets.[6] This paper will argue that *the increase in ISR assets and the proper projection of the organic ISR capabilities is the critical requirement to the success of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team.* Based on the changes to the operational concept of the SBCT, the tactical intelligence community's response is the improved projection of ISR assets, without which the SBCT would fail at achieving the desired effects of precision engagement.

The intent here is to produce a single-source document that consolidates information on intelligence efforts related to the success of the Interim Brigade Combat Team at Fort Lewis, Washington, and addresses how the tactical intelligence community responds to meet the high operational demands imposed by the new SBCT.

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[6] Joint Vision 2020, 22.

Hence, the objective of this paper is three-fold: 1) highlight the Army's effort and strategy for transformation, analyzing the requirements and changes imposed upon the supporting intelligence collection units and their subsequent response in providing intelligence to the BCT commander; 2) determine if the Transformation Strategy changes the fundamental and traditional roles of the tactical intelligence community; and 3) outline and analyze why the new SBCT can not effectively conduct operations without the improved ISR organization, structure and projection of intelligence assets.

Responsiveness, deployability, agility, versatility, lethality, survivability, and sustainability are the much-advertised and discussed operational characteristics of the newly transformed BCT. But regardless of the transformation-related changes, additions, and improvements of the battlefield operating systems, success is obtained with the leveraging of organic ISR because of its contribution to the commander's situational dominance.

The elements of the new ISR support package conduct its traditional functions and continues to enable the commanders to achieve success at effectively dominating maneuver with precision; thus, fulfilling the goal of the SBCT. A combination of current and proposed doctrine is being examined to provide fundamental principles by which the commander guides the SBCT's tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP).

Doctrine and Definitions

In this thesis, intelligence-related doctrine and definitions are extrapolated from current Army Field Manuals series 34 and 17. Doctrine is defined as a theory based

on carefully worked out principles and taught or advocated by its adherents.[7] It

provides for the Army a common, flexible framework of thought and expectation. [8]

But it is not a binding, rigid adherence to a set of TTP that tells how to fight. It is

fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their

actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in

application.[9]

Field Manual (FM) 34-1*, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations* is the

Army's foundational capstone manual for military intelligence doctrine. [10] FM 34-80:

Brigade and Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations [11] provides the

historical foundation for tactical signals intelligence operations, which represent the

core capability of the SBCT's technical collection effort. Currently, there is sufficient

doctrine for MI operations in the SBCT.

FM 17-95, *Cavalry Operations,* sets forth doctrinal principles and TTP as

necessary to clarify or emphasize the doctrinal principles of cavalry operations.

Currently, there is no standing doctrine for the RSTA SQDN in the SBCT. FM 3-20

series of manuals are in development and will supersede the FM 17 series,

addressing new RSTA doctrine for SBCT operations.

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[7] *Webster's New World College Dictionary*, 3rd ed., 1997, under the term "doctrine."

[8] U.S. Army, Field Manual (FM) 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations* (Washington DC: Department of the Army, September 1994), iii. Cited hereafter as U.S. Army FM 34-1.

[9] *Joint Electronic Library*, under "doctrine," *Microsoft Network* 8.0, URL: < http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data>, accessed 12 January 2003.

[10] U.S. Army FM 34-1, iii.

[11] U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 34-80, *Brigade and Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations* (Washington DC: Department of the Army, April 1986).

Also, in this thesis are terms commonly used by the military services and the intelligence community that refer to the source and means of any given piece of intelligence. Intelligence is information and knowledge obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) refers to the means by which information is observed. Reconnaissance is a specific active mission performed to obtain specific data. [12] Surveillance is systematic and passive observation of areas to collect whatever data is available for a more extended duration of time.[13] The primary differences are the active and passive measures employed to obtain information and the duration of the mission. For the purposes of this paper, the distinctions between intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are not important unless specified.

ISR is the coordinated, synchronized effort referring to the system of collection assets and analysts that brings information about the enemy or potential enemy to the decision-maker. Integrated ISR support is critical to the force's ability to conduct power projection operations. The Army's field manual on ISR states that:

> The role of [Intelligence], Reconnaissance and Surveillance has not changed on the modern battlefield [including the SBCT]. If anything, it has become more important. Battles at combat training centers prove that a good ISR effort is critical to successful attacks. On the other hand, a poor ISR effort almost guarantees defeat for the commander. [14]

Targeting and target acquisition [15] identifies high value targets (HVTs) and high payoff targets (HPTs) that support the commander's concept of operation. Then

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[12] U.S. Army FM 34-1, G-8.

[13] U.S. Army FM 34-1, G-8.

[14] U.S. Army FM 34-1, 1-1.

[15] U.S. Army FM 34-8, 1-2.

the assets detect and locate those targets with sufficient accuracy to facilitate attacks by fire, maneuver, and electronic means.

Additional terms in this thesis refer to the various intelligence areas[16], disciplines, and functions performed by specialized personnel. They are:

- Human Intelligence (HUMINT)--Intelligence derived through human sources. It includes interrogation of EPWs & civilians, translation of captured documents, patrols, OPs, and front-line troops.

- Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)--Intelligence from intercepted electromagnetic emissions. It includes locating communications and non-communications means for intelligence.

- Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)--Intelligence gained from photographic, radar, or infrared imagery.

- Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT)--Intelligence derived from other technically measurable aspects of the target, such as vibrations or hyper-spectral emissions

The disciplines themselves must complement and cue each other for maximum effectiveness [17] [in the SBCT].

The SBCT is capable of exploiting all four of the major intelligence doctrinal disciplines with MI and cavalry platforms embedded to maximize its contribution to the collection effort and overall situational awareness. This ensures the combat unit

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[16] U.S. Army FM 34-1, 2-4, 2-5.

[17] U.S. Army FM 34-1, 2-4.

gains proper awareness before it is committed against a possible or identified threat which is the dominant characteristic of SBCT operations.

It is evident that the SBCT developmental planners first understood the historical roles, traditions, and current doctrinal missions of both the MI and cavalry forces. Additionally, they integrated new concepts to maximize the benefits offered by emerging technology to form the collection community for the SBCT. The Army's challenge in responding to transformation efforts lies in improving the balance within ISR systems, applying traditional processes and advanced technology to support modernization initiatives.

CHAPTER 2

TRANSFORMING TODAY'S ARMY

*The times we live in are times of profound change, dramatic
and fundamental change – political, idealogical, and technical.
We must adapt to that change, and we must grow.* [18]

—GEN Gordan R. Sullivan, 23 May 1993

Whereas it is clear that a substantial portion of the United States Military community is not convinced of the need for aggressive change, General Meyers (CJCS) argues that the Armed Forces must develop new capabilities in order to become more strategically responsive. Most critics agree that change just for the sake of change is irresponsible and wasteful. They contend that is must be framed in the context of existing and potential requirements. However, extensive research reveals that the seeds for current Army transformation efforts were sown as a result of valid requirements stemming from small-scale contingency (SSC) operational deployments to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo.

For example, The MK19-mounted HMMWVs[19] the Rangers used in Somalia could only suppress the enemy and facilitate breaking contact. The Rangers could not have been successfully evacuated without allied Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) on the scene. These AFVs were better suited to absorb the intense enemy's small arms fire which would have been catastrophic to HMMWVs.

Another example is the mission in Afghanistan. The Rangers could have held the southern Afghanistan airfield after their parachute jump and conducted

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[18] U.S. Army FM 34-1, 1-1.

[19] The Military's M998 Truck is named the High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). The MK19 is a 40mm Machine Gun/Grenade Launcher.

mobile blocking operations along the Pakistani border to prevent Taliban and al Qaeda terrorists from escaping if they were equipped with a heavier capability. [20]

These recent SSC missions are examples of the requirement and dilemma that was facing the United States Army: the need for a well-informed force to quickly mobilize, conduct early entry operations with self protection, deter threats from engaging, and ultimately shape the battlefield for decisive operations. Well-informed is enabled with by organic ISR capability, while a heavier carrier enables quick mobilization with increased self-protection.

One of the increasing near-term strategic tasks facing the Army is adapting and adjusting to the emerging operational environment. It is likely that there will be more occurrences of SSC operations rather than major theaters of war (MTW). Therefore, the overall goal of transformation is the creation of a force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations.

Army Transformation initiatives, that incorporate and expand upon earlier Force XXI and Army After Next programs, were first launched at an October 1999 AUSA Conference. General Shinseki unveiled a new modernization paradigm for the Army in the 21st century. He spoke of the Army's dilemma and outlined a transformation plan that would see the Army finally become "a force that is strategically responsive and dominant at every point on the spectrum of operations." [21]

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[20] Mike Sparks, "Nothing Learned from Black Hawk Down," *Microsoft Network* 8.0, URL: <http://www.g2mil.com/BlackhawkDown.htm>, accessed 3 March 2003.

[21] Vice Adm. Arthur K. Cebrowski (Ret.), "U.S. Army Transformation Campaign Plan" *Microsoft Network 8.0*, URL: <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2001/t11272001_t1127ceb.html>, accessed 2 March 2003.

Transformation Strategy

As a result of General Shinseki's speech, the Army responded to his vision by developing and implementing the Army Transformation Concept. The phased concept began with the development of BCTs and will end with the transition of the Army to an Objective Force. [22] The complexity of transformation was captured in a single chart, which depicts (as arrows) the paths for development of the key elements (See Figure 1) [23]: The key to understanding transformation is grasping the concept for each of the forces, which are:

1) Legacy,

2) Objective, and

3) Interim.

In an Army Transformation speech, Gen Shinseki said, "To sustain a force that provides the necessary combat overmatch, the Army must rebuild and selectively upgrade Legacy Force systems. This capitalization and modernization effort will return selected systems to like-new condition and extend Army capabilities into the future." Maintaining the current forces represents the solution until a merging of the parallel axes (See Figure 1) of the Army's Transformation Strategy into the Objective Force capabilities and era.

The Legacy Forces are the Army's current forces, heavy and light. The heavy forces are lethal and survivable, but lack agility[24]. Conversely, the light

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[22] Major Ted L. Martens, USA, "The Brigade Combat Team—The Transformation Process," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*, 4, July-September 2000. Cited hereafter as Martens.

[23] The development of each force is depicted as moving along its designated axis en route to both the Objective Force and era. The three prongs represent an event-driven process to meet current and projected challenges facing the Army throughout the transformation process.

forces are extremely responsive and deployable, but lack lethality without significant augmentation.


Figure 1 [25]

These existing units provide the Army's essential capability in support of any current conflict while the Army transforms. They guarantee near-term warfighting readiness to support the National Military Strategy.[26] In order for transformation to work, the Legacy Force plays a significant role in maintaining, validating and reinforcing its non-negotiable contract to fight and win the nation's wars, not only now but also for several more decades. Legacy Forces will continue to train with its existing weapons, equipment and force structure. Maintaining the current forces represents the solution until a merging of the parallel axes of the Army's Transformation Strategy into the Objective Force.

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[24] Agility in this sense refers to the ability to quickly deploy to a region.

[25] AUSA Convention Eisenhower Luncheon.

[26] Ibid.

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The Objective Force is the manifestation of the transformed force intended to achieve the Army's Vision. It represents the solution to the heavy versus light, deployability versus survivability and lethality quandary addressed in the analysis of the Legacy Force. It will be a combined arms team designed to be responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and a sustainable force; able to dominate across the entire spectrum of conflict. Once fully fielded, the Army will be able to deploy a combat capable brigade in 96 hours, a division in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days. Though the goal of the Army's transformation program manifests with the fielding of the Objective Force, it is the Interim Force serves as the Army's vanguard and offers the nation a force to deploy rapidly, and take on the tough roles called for today.

The Interim Forces represent the solution to the near-term capabilities gap while simultaneously providing the vehicle for long-term transformation initiatives. Since technology for the Objective Force is not available today, the Interim Force is the vector of Army Transformation. [27] This dynamic new organization is the technological bridge to the future of operating across the full spectrum of conflict.

The operating environment for the Interim Forces will be considerably different from the Cold War period. Legacy Forces will continue to be prepared to face those challenges as they occur. As GEN Shinseki said in a recent speech, "The Brigade Combat Teams of that Interim Force bridge the gap in our current operational shortfall between early arriving light forces and later-arriving heavy ones." In order to operate in the emerging environment, the Army will harness existing technology and build six lethal and deployable BCTs that provide

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[27] Ibid.

enhanced, strategic Army options. In the article*, "Armor, Cavalry, and Transformation: 'New' Cavalry for the Interim Force",* the authors contend that*:*

> In the Information Age, the time necessary to make a decision and then to act upon that decision will be greatly condensed. Therefore, with the Interim Force, major regional crises may actually be prevented from expanding into conflicts. This is possible by quickly deploying a capable force into theater. Once on the ground, that force must have the capability to conduct a full range of combat operations. [28]

It is imperative to understand that the Interim Force is a combat asset, not an experimental organization. The first BCT (SBCT #1)[29] has achieved its initial operational capability; thus, even with departures from the Legacy Force supporting roles, it is subject to deployment into combat with a changed organizational force structure, weapons systems, characteristics, and capabilities.

Departures from Legacy Force ISR

The ISR community is making the largest force structure change from the legacy concept amongst the supporting SBCT units (See Figure 2). The Legacy Force MI Battalion task organizes a direct support [30] (DS) company to each maneuver BCT providing reconnaissance, surveillance and analysis. The general

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[28] Colonel Kevin C.M. Benson and Lieutenant Colonel (P) Dana J.H. Pittard, USA, "Armor, Cavalry, and Transformation: "New" Cavalry for the Interim Force," *Armor*, March-April 2001, 8. Cited hereafter as Benson and Pittard.

[29] The Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs) will be numbered. Currently, SBCT #1 and #2 are at Fort Lewis, Washington.

[30] Direct Support (DS) is a mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance. When operating in a DS role, missions can be coordinated directly between the assigned unit and the supported unit.

support (GS) company[31] provides intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) support to the entire division, some of which influences operations in each brigade's sector. In a Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin article, the author wrote:

> In the new SBCTs, the MI Company is organic. Gone is the habitual relationship of the Direct Support MI Company within the MI Battalion at division level. The rapid deployment criteria and the unit cohesion required in the SBCT demand an intelligence support organization that lives, breathes, and understands how the SBCT fights and its unique information requirements.[32]

The new intelligence organization in the SBCT represents a compilation of units previously task-organized from parent units providing support, now organic providing vital SBCT ISR capabilities (See Figure 3).

Figure 2 [33]

[31] General Support (GS) is the support that is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. Units may be placed in GS to several units, receiving missions from their parent headquarters (HQs) based upon support priorities established by commanders.

32 Martens, 5.

[33] See Glossary for definition of acronyms, equipment and capabilities.

Figure 3 [34]

Perhaps the largest organizational change is the transition from tank battalions to RSTA SQDNs (See Figure 4). This is a major departure from the traditional employment. Traditional cavalry missions are less reconnaissance oriented and more focused on the guard, screen, and cover missions. These missions are characterized by bold, overt, and combined arms maneuver. These transformation efforts take Armor and Cavalry into the 21st century. The new units conducting reconnaissance and surveillance have an expanded focus and mission beyond the traditional employment.

Additionally, the incorporation of significant MI assets (traditionally GS) as organic elements forms the RSTA SQDN's surveillance troop which affords the ability to aggressively collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while denying an adversary's ability to do the same (See Figures 3, 4).

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[34] G2, I Corps, Brief to Military Intelligence Officers, subject: "Brigade Combat Team Military Intelligence," attachment to e-mail from Major Eric Land, USA, Brigade Combat Team S2, FT Lewis, WA to author, 6 January 2003.

IBCT Cavalry Squadron
(02/08/00)

Squadron Roll up	PAX	LAVs
HHT	82	4
Recce Troop (x3)	270	45
Surveillance Troop	57	3
Totals	409	52

Cavalry Squadron (39/1/369)

Squadron HHT (16/1/65)

HHT (16/1/65) 4 X LAVs

Squadron HHT	PAX	LAVs
CMD Group	13	0
S1/S4	5	0
S2 / ISR Integration	8	0
S3	15	0
S6	12	0
HQs	6	0
Medical PLT	22	4
Unit Ministry Team	1	0
Totals	82	4

Recce Troop (6/0/84)

HQs (3/0/14)

Recce PLT (1/0/20) 4 X LAVs Javelin

Mort Sec (0/0/10) 2 X Mortar LAVs 2 x 120 mm

Recce Troop	PAX	LAVs
HQs	17	1
Recce Platoons(x3)	63	12
MORT Sect	10	2
Totals	90	14

Surveillance Troop (5/0/52)

HQs (2/0/5)

UAV PLT (1/0/16)

SENS PLT (1/0/20)

NBC PLT (1/0/11) 3 X LAVs

Surveillance Troop	PAX	LAVs
HQs	7	0
UAV PLT	17	0
Sensor PLT	21	0
NBC PLT	12	3
Totals	57	3

See Figure 4 [35]

This significantly increases the situational awareness of the SBCT commander. It combines IEW and Cavalry assets into one unit, which is at the complete disposal of the SBCT Commander. In a Jane's Defense interview, MG Thomas stated that:

> Increasing the reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) capabilities of the US Army's SBCTs will be key to these formations' [SBCT] viability. … the RSTA Squadron as a whole has full-spectrum collection capability, everything from HUMINT to NBC to SIGINT to sensors.…Army intelligence will shift the focus of its collection efforts away from SIGINT to a more balanced approach…We are trying to balance the intelligence capability by increasing the imagery and HUMINT segments.[36]

With the Legacy division's GS company now organic to the RSTA SQDN, and the Legacy brigade's DS company now under administrative control

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[35] Benson and Pittard, 9.

[36] Major General John Thomas, USA, Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence Center, *"Military Intelligence Transformation,"* interview by Andrew Koch, in *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 21 June 21 2000. Cited hereafter as Thomas interview.

(ADCON)[37] of the RSTA SQDN, this is an unprecedented amount of collection assets and activity available to and directed by the SBCT Commander.   As a result, the SBCT now has it own collection and analysis unit. This facilitates coordinated training, unit integrity and removes the challenge inherent in the cross-unit coordination of the past. There are significant demands of the operational methods that drive changes in the associated intelligence functionalities. The SBCT provides a significant improvement to supporting situational awareness through its ability to perform distributed and collaborative analysis of intelligence. The United States Army Intelligence and the Armor Centers continue to be an integral player in the transformation effort. They are ensuring intelligence and cavalry operations remain key to achieving success in combat, no matter what its form.

There are many intelligence-related changes, adjustments, and improvements to the organization, structure, and employment of the SBCT. The Interim Force's cavalry and MI assets combine and contribute to providing the commander and his subordinate units the ability to see and understand the entirety of a multi-dimensional enemy and develop and sustain a thorough understanding of the situation.

In an article outlining the characteristics of the SBCT, the author wrote:

> The initial brigade combat teams will have a more robust and varied intelligence capability, from the military intelligence companies [traditional and surveillance troop in RSTA SQDN] down to the company level…this is not the brigade that finds the fight by bumping into it.

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[37] Administrative Control (ADCON) is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, and discipline and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.

Consequently, the need for ISR assets to gather information and intelligence about the enemy in this [emerging] environment cannot be overstated [regardless of any changes].[38] In Tracy Goss' book, T*he Last Word on Power*, she wrote:

> Transformation and change are different phenomena. Change is a function of altering what you are doing --to improve something that is already possible in your reality (better, different, or more).   Transformation is a function of altering the way you are being--to create something that is currently not possible in your reality.

While change is inherent in transformation, one need not transform to simply change. The Army's transformation initiative aims to change the Army to be dominant across the full spectrum of conflict, anywhere, when needed. The new SBCT concept for warfighting requires significant improvements in order to expose the enemy by combat action, setting conditions, and destroying them in close combat with precision. The concept is both capabilities and threat-based to compensate for the expected threats on the highly ambiguous, complex, and dynamic battlefield of the future. The new ISR community is designed for success in any type of operation while optimized for major theater war. The response of the ISR community of projecting newly improved ISR enables the SBCT to master the transitions and changes in the diversity of 21st Century military operations. Thus validating Gen Gordon Sullivan's charge for all servicemen to "adapt to change and grow".

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[38] Benson and Pittard, 9.

CHAPTER 3

COMMAND DRIVEN INTELLIGENCE

*It is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use
the highest intelligence in the army for the purposes of spying and
thereby they achieve great results.*
                                                    —Sun Tzu, Art of War

To piece the [battlefield] puzzle together, the commander has [always had] a wide variety of intelligence assets available to him, such as national intelligence sources, military intelligence units, long-range surveillance detachments, aviation, combat electronic warfare and intelligence platforms, cavalry units, and any unit in contact. [39] The collection of information on adversaries is as old as war itself. In an excerpt taken from a lecture at the Military Intelligence Officers Basic Course (MIOBC) [40], an instructor stated:

> The first real tactical and operational field intelligence came during the Philippine War of 1899-1902. In an effort to combat the guerrillas, the Army divided its units into small garrisons around the Philippines. In each garrison, an officer was assigned to coordinate information on the TERRAIN and ENEMY. They helped make charts [for the commander] of their area of operations and gathered information on the guerrillas. Most of this information came from spies, deserters, prisoners, or captured documents. In 1900, a Military Information Division was created for the entire Philippines, thus centralizing the efforts. [41]

The intelligence effort has always been a commander-driven process. As a result, effective collection and analysis of intelligence is useless if it does not reach

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[39] U.S. Army, Field Manual (FM) 17-95, *Cavalry Operations*, (Washington, D.C: Department of the Army, December 1996), p. 5. Cited hereafter as U. S. Army FM 17-95.

[40] MIOBC at For Huachuca is designed to instruct MI Lieutenants on the basics of intelligence operations. "History of Military Intelligence," *Microsoft Network 8.0*, URL: <www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/miotc/mihist.htm>, accessed 5 March 2002.

him in a form he can use and at the time he needs it. This is a synopsis of the enduring tenets [42] of effective intelligence collection operations.

Commanders have always needed effective intelligence during the execution of current operations and planning for future operations to be precise in the maneuver and application of combat power against the enemy. A systems and capabilities based strategy for intelligence collection was chronicled in the 1984 memorandum *"The Evolution of Military Intelligence"* by Major General Sidney T. Weinstein, former Commander of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center. Its central premise was that MI's evolution as a branch was based on its response to the increasing demands [of the commander] for timely and accurate intelligence. Weinstein identified five functions needed to support tactical commanders; including: 1) Targeting, 2) Targeting Development, 3) Situational Development (most critical), 4) Operations Security, and 5) Electronic Warfare.

The five functions delineated by Weinstein rationalized the force structure and equipment that made up today's tactical MI units. MI [Corps] continues building a balanced force driven by sound doctrine and training which focuses intelligence downwardly on the commander, to deliver intelligence on time, every time. [43] Regardless of the transformation initiative or era in which the Armed Forces operate, the historic role of intelligence has and will always be centered around collection of information in support of the commander's requirement to make decisions.

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[42] The Characteristics of Effective Intelligence: Timely, Relevant, Accurate, and Predictive.

[43] U.S. Army FM 34-1, v.

Historical Perspective

The emergence of MI as a distinct professional discipline within the Army is a comparatively recent development. For most of recorded history, cavalry, scouts, and spies collected intelligence; and each commander served as his own intelligence officer.[44] In many respects, World War I proved to be a major milestone in the development of MI within the United States Army. As a result, rudimentary intelligence organizations were set up, and most of today's intelligence tasks and disciplines were put in place.

Today, MI accomplishes its mission through six primary tasks [45] that generate synchronized intelligence to support the commander's mission and intelligence requirements; such as, 1) Provide Indications and Warnings (I&W), 2) Perform Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), 3) Perform Situation Development (most critical)[46], 4) Perform Target Development and Support to Targeting, 5) Support Force Protection, and 6) Perform Battle Damage Assessment (BDA). While there are some changes to the primary intelligence tasks, the commander's need for systems and process in place to facilitate situation development remains paramount.

There are technological advances and newly structured units today in support of the commander's information requirements. But, these same basic functions continue to assist the commander in focusing and directing his combat

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[44] John P. Finnegan , "The Military Intelligence Story: A Photographic History," *Microsoft Network* 8.0, URL: <http://asa.npoint.net/mistory.htm>, accessed 16 January 2003.

[45] U.S. Army FM 34-1, 2-7, 2-8.

[46] Situation development enables commanders to see and understand the battlefield in sufficient time and detail to make sound tactical decisions.

power. However, MI was never intended to be the sole provider of intelligence to the commander.

The Armor Branch's cavalry has also traditionally conducted collection activity in support of the commander's effort to employ force against the enemy. The Cavalry historically served as a flexible multipurpose force. [47] Capitalizing upon a significant mobility advantage over infantry, cavalry performed long-range reconnaissance and security missions for commanders. These missions gave commanders the ability to maneuver and concentrate forces on a battlefield for combat. Once on the chosen field, cavalry continued to play key roles [48] such as: close reconnaissance to detect enemy weaknesses (the most critical), close security to protect the flanks or rear of the infantry line, countering enemy cavalry, counterattacking enemy infantry attacks, reserve, administering the decisive blow to a faltering enemy, covering retreat, and pursuing a retreating enemy.

The fundamental purpose of cavalry on the battlefield translates into roles that they perform for the commander. These roles are not necessarily missions themselves, but are translated into mission statements by the regimental commander or squadron commander. They represent the intent of the commander when he assigns a mission to the cavalry unit. [49]

The ISR support is of the utmost importance to the Interim Force [SBCT]. It requires a coordinated effort by the entire tactical intelligence community. This community forms diverse array of reconnaissance and target acquisition platforms

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[47] U.S. Army FM 17-95, 1.

[48] Ibid.

[49] U.S. Army 17-95, 5.

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that are a functional part of the basic intelligence force structure in the SBCT and provide direct intelligence support to the commander.

Both the MI Corps and Armor Branch built a balanced force driven by sound doctrine and training which focuses their respective products in a downward manner to the commander. The SBCT incorporates the five key principles [50] of intelligence support to force projection; including, 1) Commander-driven intelligence (the most critical), 2) Intelligence synchronization, 3) Split-based operations, 4) Tactical tailoring, and 5) Broadcast dissemination.

In his article *"Projecting Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance in Support of the Interim Brigade Combat Team,"* Lieutenant Colonel Stephen P. Perkins identified intelligence requirements for the future combat environment. He noted that, "the variety of field manuals produced by the U.S. Army Intelligence and the Armor Centers address holistic procedures. The challenges facing both communities derive from the dynamic nature of the TTP and keeping up with the changing operational environment." As stated in Chapter One of this paper, adapting to that changing operational environment is the near-term strategic task facing the Army. The authors of FM 34-1 stated in the Preface, "when the world changes, doctrine must change; yet, it must not depart radically from principles of combat that have stood the test of time from ancient history to the present."

The traditional roles and functions of collection units have solid doctrinal foundations and must be (and are being) maintained. While the SBCT incorporates the principles of intelligence, a methodology for updating its doctrine

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[50] U.S. Army FM 34-1, 1-4.

in a timely manner must become a centerpiece of maintaining one of the

intelligence's primary features—disciplined operations. [51] Change is required of

the intelligence community in order to better support the operational demands of

the SBCT. It is of grave importance for leaders to grasp the concepts and

embrace the adjusted methods of their trades.

> Such organizational changes are needed because "for this organization
> to function, to have the kind of lethality and survivability it needs given
> the constraints of being able to deploy anywhere in 96 hours, it requires
> exceptional situational awareness", says Gen Thomas. "The integration of
> intelligence in the whole organization is very important to move us toward
> that ability.[52]

After having reviewed the structural and organizational changes imposed

upon the intelligence collection community in the SBCT, three significant factors

remain constant. First, a methodical commander-driven intelligence effort is

central to the success or failure of the ISR effort in support of operations. Second,

the operational success of a unit's operation depends on the employment of ISR

assets in order to provide intelligence that grants the commander more situational

awareness. Third, intelligence doctrine and associated manuals were developed

with the premise that changes in the operational environment would drive

appropriate changes instead of radical departures from sound foundational

principles. Therefore, while some changes were inevitable with the formulation of

the SBCT, it is evident that the fundamental and traditional roles of the tactical

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[51] LTC Stephen P. Perkins, USA, *Projecting Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance in Support of the Interim Brigade Combat Team*, Army War College Thesis (Carlisle, PA: Army War College, June 2000), 13. Cited hereafter as Perkins.

[52] Thomas Interview.

intelligence community remained the same. It was designed to respond to the

increasing demands [of the commander] for timely and accurate intelligence.

CHAPTER 4

PROJECTING ISR IN SUPPORT OF THE STRYKER BCT

The Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) gains its lethality and survivability from maneuver and maintaining positional advantage over an opponent. To capitalize fully on the tremendous capabilities of the IBCT, the organization must achieve superior situational understanding. Military Intelligence is a major contributor to achieving this capability.

—Major General John D. Thomas[53]

The newly organized SBCT is capable of early entry to counter the threat, but is highly dependent on ISR to achieve dominant maneuver and precision engagement. Therefore, ISR integration is of the utmost importance to the success of the Interim Force's SBCT. Proper projection of organic ISR requires a coordinated effort by the local tactical intelligence community to provide the unit with the ability to achieve intelligence superiority throughout the battlespace. Thus, the projection of ISR serves as the SBCT's operational and tactical critical requirement. A by-product of effectively projecting organic ISR assets is improving upon situational awareness.

While the dynamic nature of the future battlespace challenges all of the battlefield operating systems, the intelligence battlefield operating system has the critical mission of providing the Interim Brigade's [SBCT] situational awareness crucial to dominate maneuver and [its] precision strike requirements. [54]   Situational dominance is preceded by an understanding of the operation that begins with

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[53] Major General John D. Thomas, Commandant, U.S. Army Intelligence School "VANTAGE POINT: The Initial Brigade Combat Team," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*, April-June 2000, 2.

[54] Perkins, 4.

developing a broader, deeper, understanding of the totality of the battlespace. This

understanding enables the BCT Commander to anticipate, forestall, and dominate

the enemy at a time and place of preferred choosing with the appropriate force.

Situational awareness and understanding of the battlespace is the

fundamental force enabler across all SBCT battlefield operating systems.

Developing an understanding of the situation now requires a multi-dimensional

approach to intelligence collection, surveillance, and reconnaissance that goes

beyond the Cold War singular intelligence focus on military forces.

The [transformation] initiative is intended to make the Army more

responsive, deployable, agile, and lethal; and the MI Corps and Armor Branch have

been significantly integrated into these efforts. They are the major contributors to

support the demands of the transformed force. Major General John Thomas stated

that:

> Increasing the reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA)
> capabilities of the US Army's new medium brigades will be key to these formations'
> [IBCT] viability. … the RSTA squadron as a whole has full-spectrum [information]
> collection capability, everything from HUMINT to NBC to SIGINT to sensors. [55]

The SBCT's organization is uniquely information-centric. [56] It is information-oriented

first, then force (enemy) and terrain-oriented. This creates an additional challenge in

planning for multidimensional ISR collection operations as the requirement for

accurate information spans all echelons of the brigade.

The SBCT embeds ISR to the lowest levels and throughout the organization;

and has all of the newest military intelligence systems and offers a true

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[55] Thomas interview.

[56] Perkins, 6.

multidiscipline capability. [57]   In the same Janes interview with MG Thomas, he

stated that:

> Army intelligence will shift the focus of its collection efforts away from SIGINT to a more balanced [all-source] approach … We are trying to balance the intelligence capability by increasing the imagery and HUMINT segments. **[58]**

Complete all-source ISR integration is a crucial component of the SBCT. The

organic MI Company provides the balanced exploitation of assets needed for

effective projection of intelligence support to the SBCT.

Projecting ISR in the SBCT—The Military Intelligence Company

The Directorate of Combat Developments developed a unique company

structure that includes analysis, collection, and ISR planning and execution. They

optimized the traditional MI organization for high-intensity conflict, and added

capabilities to address the contingencies in the lower end of the spectrum. The

organic MI Company provides support that encompasses planning, preparation, and

execution of multiple, simultaneous decisive actions on a distributed battlefield. [59] It

essentially operates as an extension of the brigade intelligence staff (S2) for internal

and external management of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

collection assets. [60]

The company contains organic systems necessary to interface with

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems resident at division, Army

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[57] Perkins, 6.

[58] Thomas interview.

[59] Marten, 5.

[60] Perkins, 6.

Force, joint, theater, and national levels, and supports the tactical human intelligence

activities required in the small scale contingency environment.[61] It provides analysis

to support the development of the Interim Brigade's common operational picture

(COP), targeting/effects, and intelligence preparation of the battlefield. [62] The

company is composed of three platoons (See Figure 3).

The ISR Analysis Platoon performs database management, situation

development and targeting. The platoon focuses on receiving, processing, fusing,

and analyzing information originating from both organic collectors and theater, joint,

and national agencies and organizations. [63] It provides continuous support to plans

and operations by conducting predictive analysis and targeting. The platoon fuses

single-source intelligence into the COP; and uses digital connectivity to enhance

timely intelligence reporting. [64] It relies upon it's higher headquarters to provide

long-term detailed analysis, tailored Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

products focused at the user level, and access to distributed databases and

products.

The ISR Integration Platoon is the hub of the company. It performs ISR

synchronization, SIGINT and IMINT exploitation and analysis, and weather analysis

to provide near-real time data. It is equipped with Common Ground Station, ASAS

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[61] Ibid.

[62] Ibid. The common operating picture (COP) is the current set of command and staff estimates, situation graphics, and other relevant data that is understood by and digitally accessible to all parts of the force.

[63] Martens, 5.

[64] CPT Christina McCormmick, USA, CDR 209th MI Company, Fort Lewis, WA, email interview by author, 12 January 2003. Cited hereafter as McCormmick interview.

RWS, and IMETS.[65] The platoon comprises three sections: the ISR Requirements

Section, S2X element, and CGS section.[66] In addition to exploiting and analyzing the

above stated sources and products respectively, CPT McCormick stated that:

> …it is also responsible for developing NAI, PIR-SIR-SOR linkage; managing the ISR synchronization matrix; forwarding collection requests to higher; monitoring higher collection asset schedule in order to fill collection gaps and capitalize on all assets available; and the officer in charge serves as the MI company's representative for targeting in order to ensure ISR synchronization with targeting plan.[67]

The Tactical HUMINT Platoon performs human collection and

counterintelligence operations. The platoon is composed of four Operational

Management Teams (OMTs) of four soldiers each. Every team has three 97E

(Human Intelligence Collector) and one 97B (Counterintelligence Agent) soldiers to

provide a combination of HUMINT and Counterintelligence expertise.[68] OMTs and

the S2X report and pass data amongst themselves via the UHF single-channel

satellite communications (SATCOM) system AN/PSC-5 (SPITFIRE) and CHATS.[69]

The tactical HUMINT teams are tied into the Tactical Internet (TI) via the Future

Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) and the Enhanced Position Location

Reporting System (EPLRS).[70]

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[65] The IMETS is a mobile tactical automated weather data receiving, processing, and dissemination system designed to provide timely weather and environmental effect forecasts, observations, and decision aid support to the Army.

[66] Martens, 7.

[67] McCormick interview.

[68] Martens, 6.

[69] AN/PSC-5 is a lightweight, manpack, line-of-sight and tactical satellite communications terminal that serves as a primary command-and-control single-channel radio. CHATS is the suite of hardware designed to meet the unique requirements of CI/HUMINT teams operating in the field.

[70] FBCB2 provides situational awareness and command and control to the lowest tactical echelons. It facilitates a seamless flow of battle command information across the battlespace, and interoperates with external

Military Intelligence Analysis

In analyzing the SBCT's MI Company, the employment of organic intelligence with maneuver units is not a new concept as it is habitual in Armored Calvary Regiments (ACRs).   But, Legacy Force MI companies provide direct support to the brigade, while remaining under the centralized control of the MI Battalion. The essence of the mission has not changed. The MI Company still provides timely, relevant, accurate, and synchronized ISR support to the commander, staff and subordinates. But now the MI Company has a new organic relationship and role in the SBCT. With its own assets and analytical power, it accurately assesses the voluminous information collected by inherent means. It can now more effectively enable the commander to see the battlefield and to know the enemy. This combined with maneuver, speed and exploitation will fundamentally change the dynamics of fire and maneuver.

The SBCT's robust HUMINT assets obtain an in-depth understanding of its area through direct interaction with special police, politicians, military/para-military organizations, non-governmental and international organizations, and groups within the populace. [71] HUMINT assets in the MI enhance contributions to the COP by integrating counterintelligence and human intelligence operations conducted by the Cavalry [RSTA] Squadron.

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command and control and sensor systems. EPLRS provides secure, jam-resistant, near real-time data communications support.

[71] Perkins, 6.

Projecting ISR in the SBCT—The Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition Squadron

The most unique of all aspects of the SBCT is the RSTA SQDN, an organization dedicated to information collection and support to situational awareness and understanding. The fundamental role of the RSTA Squadron is to provide detailed situational development to the BCT Commander facilitating freedom of maneuver and the concentration of combat power at the decisive time and place. The intended purpose of the squadron is to gather intelligence information and maintain contact with enemy forces across the spectrum of conflict. [72]

The RSTA SQDN is organized and equipped to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition tasks for the SBCT. It is a tough, robust cavalry organization [73] (See Figure 4). The Recon Squadron fights for information, when the tactical situation requires, but usually attempts to avoid decisive engagement. The two key elements are the Recce[74] and Surveillance Troops. The three recce troops provide conventional ground reconnaissance enhanced with LRAS3[75] sensors. Each troop is composed of two recce platoons and a mortar section, suitable for extended protected reconnaissance in a large area of operations. The combination of infantry patrols and reconnaissance operations is an integral part of the SBCT's information gathering efforts. The RSTA SQDN operations integrate with the

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[72] Benson and Pittard, 11

[73] Ibid, 8.

[74] Abbreviation for Reconnaissance.

[75] Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3) is a long-range sensor system that gives Army reconnaissance troops the ability to detect, recognize and identify distant targets in real time.

activities of the infantry battalion reconnaissance platoons and other ISR assets managed at brigade level.[76]

The troop also employs trained human intelligence and counterintelligence experts to compliment existing sensor capabilities that are more suited for open terrain and unit/force-based information.[77] A counterintelligence agent is assigned to each of the recce squads.[78] They pass and receive data through intelligence-specific HUMINT channels as well as through their normal chains of command using the HF radio (PRC 137)[79]. These assets give the platoon additional capability to gather a broad range of information and intelligence. While the core of HUMINT assets are in the recce troops, there is a requirement for a coordinated effort for the employment of sensors between the recce and surveillance troops.

Coordinating the air/ground collectors of the surveillance troop with ground recce troops enables the squadron commander to accomplish his primary mission of providing continuous, accurate, and timely information in complex environments. The surveillance troops contain nuclear/biological/chemical (NBC), UAV, and multi-sensor platoons. It gives the squadron and the SBCT commanders an expanded surveillance and target acquisition capability. The NBC recon platoon provides the squadron the capability to survey industrial sites that could be used to manufacture chemical or biological agents, conducts NBC detection surveys, and provides force

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[76] Perkins, 8.

[77] Colonel Michael Mehaffey, "Vanguard of the Objective Force," *Military Review,* 80, September-October 2000.

[78] Major Jeffrey F. Violette and Captain William J. Carter, USA, "Military Intelligence Architecture for the Brigade Combat Team," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*, 13, July-September 2000.

[79] PRC 138 is a high frequency (HF) Manpack Transceiver radio.

protection through early warning of enemy NBC use. The UAV platoon has four

unmanned aerial vehicles, with two capable of being in the air all the time during

missions.   It extends the range of the squadron commander's "eyes" in covering

critical NAIs [named areas of interest]. [80] UAVs somewhat mitigate the lack of

manned air recce and provide squadron with valuable air/ground reconnaissance

capabilities. [81]

Finally, the multi-sensor platoon has two sections: REMBASS/GSR and

PROPHET. The REMBASS/GSR section provides distant and remote capabilities to

cover NAIs in all types of weather, day and night. The PROPHET, designated as

the main SIGINT and IEW system, provides the ability to detect, identify, track and

electronically jam enemy communications. This gives the squadron an expanded

SIGINT capability to intercept and conduct direction-finding (DF) on enemy

communications and provides a platform for future electronic warfare capabilities. [82]

As a result, the commander is able to develop and disseminate a common

operational picture throughout his units; a picture that in time will lead to increased

situational awareness, understanding, and dominance.

RSTA Analysis

In analyzing the Cavalry [RSTA] Squadron, it is important to note that the

understanding the situation begins with developing a broader, deeper understanding

of the totality of the operational environment that is essential to the SBCT's success.

The squadron helps set the conditions for the SBCT's decisive and dominant

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[80] Benson and Pittard, 10.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Ibid, 11.

operations by: 1) detecting enemy activity via aggressive reconnaissance; 2)

establishing and maintaining contact through precise application of fire; and 3)

allowing the commander to obtain situational awareness and understanding in order

to dominate. These new squadrons blend technology and soldiers' efforts into a

force that provide commanders with an enviable ability to see the battlefield. The

intended purpose of this outfit is to gather intelligence information and maintain

contact with enemy forces across the spectrum of conflict. As a result, the SBCT

commander is able to observe enemy movements with fine granularity and act in an

anticipatory manner.

Analysis of The Composite, Organic SBCT Intelligence Assets

The tactical intelligence community was uniquely organized to provide the

required multi-dimensional informational and intelligence support for the SBCT

commander in order to create conditions for increased situational awareness,

understanding and eventual dominance. The SBCT exploits MI and Cavalry assets,

employing them as an integrated suite of ISR capabilities and digitized battle

command systems all to satisfy the commander's information requirements. Both

the RSTA SQDN and MI Company make significant contributions to the requirement

of the depth of information and intelligence necessary for the commander's

situational awareness. As the [informed] commander applies judgment and

experience, he attains decision superiority.[83] With improved situational awareness

and superiority, the force is enabled to avoid surprise, make rapid decisions, control

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[83] Colonel Michael Mehaffey, "Vanguard of the Objective Force," *Military Review,* 80, September-October 2000, 10.

the time and place for combat, conduct precision maneuver, shape the battlespace with precision fires and effects, and achieve decisive outcomes.[84]

The elements of the ISR team provide the SBCT and its subordinates with an organic ISR plan, execution, all-source analysis and multidiscipline intelligence collection capability. The planning and analytic capability resides in the SBCT and battalion S2s, an MI company and a surveillance troop organic to the RSTA SQDN. The MI Company provides ISR analysis and integration support to the BCT S2 section and has the additional capability to coordinate and execute tactical HUMINT operations. The RSTA SQDN provides SIGINT, MASINT, IMINT and HUMINT (tactical questioning) support to BCT ISR operations. The other primary organic collectors reside in the field artillery battalion, the brigade support battalion and the infantry battalions.

It is evident that the Army met its intent for the intelligence community's role in the paradigm shift for SBCT operations. In an Army Times article, the writer stated that:

> The Army's concept is that a combination of the brigade's reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities and its ability to push information on enemy locations down to individual platoons and companies at the touch of a button means Stryker units will fight at a time and place of their choosing, minimizing their vulnerability.[85]

A perfect example of this paradigm shift is the elements of the movement to contact mission. The old model was to: 1) make contact, 2) develop the situation (in contact), 3) maneuver (in contact) to a point in time and space of advantage, and 4) conduct a counter-attack. The new model is to: 1) understand the situation, 2)

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[84] Ibid.

[85] Sean Naylor, "Stryker Impresses in its First Real Test," *Army Times*, 19 August 2002, 10.

maneuver to a point and time of preferred choosing, and then 3) make contact with the adversary.

ISR integration is a crucial component of the SBCT; it is the most revolutionary step in intelligence support to the Interim Forces. The MI Company receives and integrates the RSTA SQDN S2's analysis of his battlespace (including the subordinate battalion's) into the SBCT's overall battlespace threat situation. It also receives amplifying data from higher headquarters and provides technical guidance to the RSTA SQDN's specialized assets (primarily the PROPHET).

The ISR community aggressively embraced the technologies and organizational techniques that were emerging. As a result of the function-specific and integrated advancements, the ISR community's new processes serve as an ameliorant to performing their battlefield mission essential tasks to include providing increased situational awareness and understanding for the commander.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper addresses how The United States Army's transformation initiatives led to the creation of a new brigade-level ISR-equipped combat force—the SBCT. It is the response to the changing, instability, and uncertainty of the operational environment regarding warfare and conflict. The adaptive and unpredictable nature of external threats along with the strategic need to reach "troubled spots" around the world prompted the Army to seek development of the rapid, decisive capabilities the SBCT possesses. With the SBCT, the Army can now deploy a force anywhere in the world within 96 hours. It provides the nation with a viable option that is capable of contributing significantly to winning wars and establishing peace throughout the world.

The intent here is to produce a document that consolidates information on intelligence efforts related to the SBCT's success. After having read numerous periodicals that addressed the various aspects and opinions of how and why the Army is transforming, I became interested in how the tactical intelligence community would respond to meet the high operational demands imposed by the new force. The discussion and analysis contained herein describes how significant and enabling ISR support is to the SBCT as a viable component of the Interim Force.

The issues relative to three key objectives framed the approach to this study. Results are as follows:

- First, the Army is leading the way in Transformation. To the leaders, it is

more than modernization. It is a holistic approach to change and it creates a strategically responsive force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations. Transformation is incorporating lessons from both its current and interim forces along with emerging technologies forming a viable response to an array of conflicts. The creation of the SBCT satisfies the brigade and below goal of the transformation strategy.

- Second, the transformation strategy does not require change to the fundamental and traditional roles of the tactical intelligence community. The most significant requirement for the SBCT is a synergistic effort from the MI Company and Cavalry units to truly provide the analyzed and synthesized situation and relevant threat picture. The use of intelligence to understand the threat for maneuver units is still essential to countering the dynamic and pervasive threats. Therefore, by embracing today's burgeoning technologies and organizational techniques, both the MI and cavalry units can better perform their battlefield mission, thereby providing the maneuver commander with the organic ISR capabilities that enable situational domination.

- Third, the SBCT cannot effectively conduct operations without the organic ISR organization and the leveraging of its assets. A complete ISR system gives commanders the ability to face adaptive enemies that are using a myriad of advanced technologies to attack the United States, be it conventionally symmetric or asymmetrically. Consequently, the operational success of the SBCT in rapid, decisive operations depends on the effective integration and employment of ISR assets. With the inherent complimentary ISR composites, the SBCT is able to close

with and destroy the enemy through synchronizing RSTA, fires, maneuver, and assault, to dominate in a dynamic battle of action-reaction-counteraction. As a result, the enemy is presented with multiple dilemmas, causing them to act ineffectively. Now, maneuver forces can gain lethal overmatch to disintegrate and dislocate enemy forces by finishing them decisively at a time and place of desired choosing.

The discussion and analysis provided in this paper describes the significance of ISR support to the SBCT's operational capabilities that facilitates awareness and dominance by commanders. After analyzing the organization and structure of both the MI and Cavalry units in the SBCT, it is evident that a coordinated effort of both units is required for success. The proper projection of ISR assets and capabilities provides a timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive operating picture throughout the battlespace for the commander. As a result, the SBCT uses organic assets to detect enemy activity, shares that information quickly, and defeats the threat before coming into close contact; or makes close contact at a time and place of desired choosing—employing precision engagement.

The new SBCT is able to see first, understand first, act first and finish decisively on the tactical battlefield. This leap-ahead operational capability, enabled by advanced technologies, is a completely new paradigm of how tactical units will fight and win; and how they will train to fight and win across the spectrum of military operations. Close tactical combat will become revolutionary through the synergy of maneuver, firepower, protection and leadership, empowered by dominant situational awareness resident in a vibrant ISR community. Therefore, it is evident that the

combined capabilities of the intelligence community serving as complimentary composites prove critical to the operational success of the SBCT. The ISR community makes significant contributions to satisfy the need for a well-informed force to quickly mobilize, conduct early entry operations, deter threats from emerging, and ultimately shape the battlefield for decisive and precise operations.

Recommendations

There are three key recommendations for continuing improvements of ISR support to the SBCT:

- First, the degree to which organic ISR succeeds depends on how creatively and effectively intelligence leaders integrate the unique skills and capabilities of the soldiers and civilians. Also, as the Interim Forces continue to conduct exercises, tests, and experiments, it is essential that force structure and development planners continue to maintain a balance between the traditional roles and missions of both forces and the burgeoning Information Age roles. As it makes the transition, Army MI must have viable, continuous education and training programs to maintain its edge.

- Second, on the surface, the changes Transformation imposes on the intelligence and cavalry communities vary, but the tenents, disciplines, and empirical characteristics are preserved. The implication is that institutional and organizational training at Forts Huachuca and Knox remain committed to proper doctrinal utilization of the invaluable capabilities of the Military Intelligence Company, Surveillance Troop and RSTA Squadron respectively

- Third, The SBCT relies on multi-nodal inputs to maintain the ability to project

and maintain an accurate and relevant COP. Army intelligence and cavalry branches must work closely with the Army Signal Command in order to ensure adequate communications mediums at the lowest levels.

The SBCT now derive their lethality and survivability from exceptional situational awareness and understanding. This evolution required organizational changes to Army brigades that have in the past separated intelligence from combined arms teams. Individually and collectively, this new ISR force provides the BCT with the capability to plan and direct ISR operations, collect and process information, produce relevant intelligence, and disseminate combat information and intelligence to those who need it, when they need it.

While the challenges of the future are daunting, the Army's tactical intelligence community is meeting the Chief of Staff's challenge at the BCT level. There can be no question but that information and intelligence [ISR] qualify as a dimension of strategy, statecraft, and war.[86] Without a doubt, ISR serves as the critical and essential enabler for SBCT effectiveness.

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[86] Colin Gray, *Modern Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 35.

GLOSSARY [87]

ACE: The Analysis and Control Element performs collection management; produces all-source intelligence; provides IEW technical control; and disseminates intelligence and targeting data. It is the focal point for the division's IEW collection management and synchronization effort. The ACE supports the commander in executing battle command and planning future missions across the range of military operations.

CGS: The Common Ground Station acquires, processes, displays, and disseminates data from multiple real-time sensors and systems including Moving Target Indicator (MTI)/Synthetic Aperture radars; Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV); Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) platforms; Signal Intelligence (SIGINT); Electronic Intelligence (ELINT); and other sources.

ASAS: The All-Source Analysis System is an Army program to automate the processing and analysis of intelligence data from all intelligence sources (INTs).

PPS-5: The AN/PPS-5B (Ground Surveillance Radar) is a portable, division level, battery powered radar set. It is used to locate, identify, and track moving ground targets at ranges up to 10,000 meters.

PRD-11: The PRD-11 "MINI-FIX" is a man-portable direction finding system. It is composed of a man-portable vehicular radio receiver and direction finder (DF) processor system, signal monitor, DF processor (the controlling unit in the DF system), and DF antenna.

TRQ-32: The TRQ-32 "Teammate" is a mobile, groundbased electronic warfare signals intelligence (EW/SIGINT) asset. It is used as a tactical direction finding and intercept system providing support to the tactical commander.

TLQ-17: The AN/TLQ-17A(V)4 "SANDCRAB" is the designation for the long range COMINT and Jamming System.is a tactical communications jammer

TSQ-138: The AN/TSQ-138 "Trailblazer" is a mobile, groundbased electronic warfare signals intelligence (EW/SIGINT) intercept system with VHF direction finding (DF) capability. It is used as a tactical direction finding and intercept system providing support to the tactical commander.

QUICKFIX: The AN/ALQ-151 is fielded in a set of three aircraft. It conducts electronic support and attack missions.

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